ISW predicts firepower Russia will sustain next year
Pravda Ukraine
Experts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) have estimated that Russia will be able to maintain its firepower with its own and North Korea’s ammunition in 2024, but significantly lower than that of 2022.
Source: ISW
Details: Experts suggest that domestic production of artillery projectiles in Russia, supplemented by increased imports of munitions from North Korea, will likely allow Russian forces to maintain sufficient artillery fire in Ukraine in 2024, albeit at a relatively lower level than in 2022.
Ants Kiviselg, Head of the Estonian Defence Intelligence Centre, stated that Russia has about four million artillery projectiles left, which Russian troops can use to wage “low intensity warfare” for another year.
Kiviselg pointed out that reports emerged of North Korea sending up to 1,000 containers carrying ammunition to Russia, each containing 300 to 500 pieces of artillery ordnance.
Kiviselg estimates that North Korea may have, therefore, provided Russia with 300,000 to 500,000 pieces of munitions, which could last up to one month at the current daily use rate of about 10,000 projectiles.
The report points out that Western sources and satellite imagery confirm that North Korean shipments, which appear to consist mainly of artillery munitions, have surged since Russian and North Korean authorities likely began more formal military-technical cooperation in September, as ISW previously reported, adding that North Korea is likely to continue deliveries.
The analysts summarise: “Based on Western estimates of Russian artillery production capacity and continued North Korean artillery exports, Russia will likely be able to maintain generally sufficient rates of fire in the foreseeable future.”
Although an overall decline in fire intensity may limit the ability of Russian forces to engage in large-scale offensive operations, the ISW believes the Russians are unlikely to face large-scale shortages that would significantly undermine defensive operations, and a decline in fire intensity would not give Ukrainian forces an advantage.
“The degree to which Ukraine’s international partners sustain Ukraine’s ability to sustain an effective weight of fire relative to Russian forces will be a key determiner of respective capabilities in 2024,” the analysts added.
To quote ISW’s Takeaways for 23 October:
- Russia’s domestic production of artillery shells, supplemented by increased ammunition imports from North Korea, will likely allow Russian forces to sustain sufficient rates of artillery fire in Ukraine in 2024, albeit at a relatively lower level than during 2022.
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka and made confirmed advances northeast of Avdiivka.
- Russian sources claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back from some newly captured positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast but noted that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence on the east bank.
- Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of 22 to 23 October.
- Ukrainian forces advanced south of Bakhmut on 23 October amid continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- The Russian government appears to be emphasising defence spending over social programs in the 2024 federal budget despite contrary messaging intended to reassure the Russian populace.
- Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on 22 October that the first group of Ukrainian pilots will begin training with instructors on F-16 fighter jets “in the near future.”
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Kupiansk, along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, south of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made confirmed gains in some areas.
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