• 11/26/2024

ISW believes Russians use chemical weapons on left bank of Kherson Oblast

Pravda Ukraine

In Kherson Oblast, Russian forces deployed chemical weapons and made a slight advance along the left bank of the Dnipro River.

Source: Institute for the Study of War (ISW)

Details: Geolocation footage released on 23 December shows that Russian troops advanced in the western part of Krynky on the river’s eastern bank.

According to military analysts, the 810th Marine Brigade of the Russian Black Sea Fleet has confirmed that it deliberately uses chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces.

The ISW stressed that this is a clear violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is a party.

On 22  December, in its Telegram channel, the 810th Brigade published a large post, in which it spoke about the “radical change in tactics” that the brigade uses against Ukrainian troops in Krynky.

The report claimed that units of the 810th Brigade rotated in the area of Krynky and used a new tactic of “dropping K-51 grenades from drones” on Ukrainian positions to outst Ukrainian forces from their positions.

The 810th Marine Brigade additionally published footage that apparently shows such a K-51 drop on a Ukrainian position, probably in Krynky.

According to the ISW, aerosol grenades are K-51s filled with  the CS (2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile) irritant gas, a type of tear gas used for riot control (also known as riot control agent (RCA)).

The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the use of RCA as a method of warfare, and Russia has been a state party to the Convention since 1997.

The ISW previously noted that Russian forces used K-51 grenades against the Ukrainian military in Donetsk Oblast in November 2022.

To quote the ISW’s Key Takeaways on 23 December: 

  • The New York Times (NYT), citing former and current senior Russian, US, and international officials, reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin was using back channels and intermediaries to signal his interest in a ceasefire, despite Putin’s recent public statements to the contrary.
  • The timing of Putin’s reported interest in a ceasefire is more consistent with Russia’s ongoing efforts to delay and discourage further Western military assistance to Ukraine, than with a serious interest in ending the war other than with a full Russian victory.
  • Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky obliquely indicated that VDV forces are under significant pressure to conduct rapid offensive operations near Bakhmut and repel Ukrainian attacks on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
  • Teplinsky also implied that the Russian military command is deploying new VDV officers and troops promptly to the frontlines without having them complete pre-combat training.
  • Russia’s Black Sea Fleet’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade confirmed that it is deliberately using chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces in an apparent violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is a party.
  • Recent analysis by OSINT analyst MT Anderson confirms that while Russian forces have moved the bulk of Black Sea Fleet (BSF) assets away from occupied Sevastopol, the BSF maintains a limited naval presence in Sevastopol.
  • The Russian information space exploited news of a Ukrainian journalist’s decision not to return to Ukraine after an assignment abroad to amplify ongoing Russian information operations about resistance to full mobilisation efforts in Ukraine that purposefully ignore the much more substantial Russian resistance to Russia’s partial mobilisation of reservists in September 2022.
  • Russian milbloggers used the granting of Russian citizenship to Palestinian refugees on 23 December to promote the idea of Russia’s “compatriots abroad” – an oft-used Kremlin justification for its war in Ukraine.
  • Russian forces made recent confirmed advances near Kupiansk and Kreminna, northeast of Bakhmut, southwest of Donetsk City, and in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact.
  • Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec subsidiary United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) Head Yuri Slyusar stated during a television interview on 19 December that UAC will increase its production of combat aircraft in 2024 and 2025, including its production of new types of aircraft.
  • Russian occupation authorities are building out electoral infrastructure in occupied Ukraine to set conditions for the upcoming presidential election.

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https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/12/24/7434370/