ISW analyses Russia’s goals in seizing Velyka Novosilka in Donetsk Oblast
Pravda Ukraine
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) points out that the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) is paying unusually much attention to the capture of Velyka Novosilka, which may indicate that the Russian Federation wants to shape the West’s perception of the situation on the battlefield and weaken international support for Ukraine. In addition, the likely capture of Velyka Novosilka and the redeployment of Russian units will indicate the direction of the Russian offensive in the spring and summer.
Source: ISW
Details: Analysts point out that Russian troops have made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian statements that the Russians captured the entire settlement on 26 January.
Geolocation footage released on 26 January indicated that Russian troops had advanced north along Tsentralna (Central) Street in the north of Velyka Novosilka.
Some Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed on 26 January that Russian troops had completely captured Velyka Novosilka, while other Russian sources claimed that Russian troops had captured most of the settlement.
Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian troops were still clearing the settlement from Ukrainian forces, including the northern part, and that Ukrainian forces were still counterattacking in the area.
Quote from ISW: “ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy 89% of the settlement, however.
The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine.”
Details: Experts note that Russian advances in western Donetsk Oblast continue to be gradual and far below the pace that is normal for modern mechanised warfare.
Moreover, the report suggests that it is unclear whether Russian troops will be able to advance quickly beyond Velyka Novosilka, as it is unclear how much combat power elements of the Russian Eastern Military District still retain after several months of continuous offensive operations.
Quote from ISW: “Velyka Novosilka is located next to several rivers which will likely complicate and hamper further Russian tactical advances in the area.
Russian forces have historically struggled with river crossings and tactical terrain features, such as rivers, will likely complicate Russian forces’ ability to leverage the seizure of Velyka Novosilka to make operationally significant advances in western Donetsk Oblast.”
Details: Experts suggest that the capture and clearing of Velyka Novosilka is likely to provide the Russian military command with opportunities and become a starting point for deciding to redeploy units of the Eastern Military District from Velyka Novosilka to other priority operational areas.
Quote from ISW: “Any redeployment of Eastern Military District elements from the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025.
The seizure of Velyka Novosilka will present the Russian military command with a decision point during which the Russian military command can pursue several courses of action.”
Details: The Russian military command may decide to leave the Eastern Military District units in western Donetsk Oblast and continue to advance to the administrative border of Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, which runs north and west of Velyka Novosilka.
The analysts believe this decision may indicate that the Russian military prefers to advance as quickly as possible towards the administrative border rather than in other areas in Donetsk Oblast or other areas along the line of contact.
The review adds that it remains unclear how capable the units remain after more than six months of intensive operations.
The Russian military command may also leave some Eastern Military District units in the Velyka Novosilka area to continue limited attacks and press Ukrainian forces in the area but redeploy the bulk of the military district to another part of the line of contact.
Quote from ISW: “Russian forces are currently intensifying offensive operations on the Kupiansk, Borova, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk and Pokrovsk fronts and are still working to eliminate the remainder of the Ukrainian salients on the Kurakhove front and in Kursk Oblast.”
To quote the ISW’s Key Takeaways on 26 January:
- Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on 26 January.
- The Russian Ministry of Defence is notably paying an abnormally high amount of attention to the claimed Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to influence Western perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and undermine international support for Ukraine.
- The seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point for the Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District (EMD) from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for offensive operations in the spring and summer of 2025.
- Russian forces are poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days, and a redeployment of EMD elements to reinforce the Russian force grouping on the Toretsk front would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks towards Kostiantynivka.
- Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of 25-26 January.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in Kursk Oblast and regained positions in Toretsk.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Pokrovsk and Kurakhove.
- Russian milbloggers criticised the Russian government on 25 January for not prioritising the recruitment and training of Russia’s next generation of military officers.
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